



The Art of Defiling

*Defeating Forensic Analysis
on Unix File Systems
the grugq*

Overview


- Introduction
 - Unix File Systems
 - Forensics
 - Anti-Forensics
 - Demonstration
 - Q & A
-

Introduction

- Who I am
 - grugq
 - What I do
 - Write intrusion prevention software
 - Break forensic tools
 - Why anti-forensics?
 - Security is an arms race
 - Trend of increased forensics
 - Trend of increased anti-forensics
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Unix File Systems

- Overview of a unix file system
- Super-Blocks
- Data Blocks
- Inodes
- Directory Files



File System Overview

- Two main parts to any file system
 - Files
 - Meta data
 - Time stamps, ownership, permissions, etc.
 - Data
 - Disk blocks organised as byte streams
 - Meta data files
 - Organise data files for human reference
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File System


- Superblock
 - Describes the file system
 - Known Location
 - Data Block
 - Data blocks store.... data!
 - Block is the lowest atomic component
 - Multiple disk sectors per block
-

File Systems: inodes

- inodes are files
- Store meta data
 - Time Stamps, Reference Counts, Size
- List of data blocks
 - block pointers

```
struct inode {  
    int  uid, gid;  
    int  size;  
    int  blk_cnt;  
    int  links;  
    int  block_ptrs[ BLOCK_NUM ];  
}
```


inode structure: graphic



Directory files

- Create the file system directory hierarchy
- Contain structures to map names to inodes

```
struct dirent {  
    int         inode;  
    short      rec_len;  
    short      name_len;  
    char       name[];  
}
```



Forensics

- Introduction
 - Data Recovery
 - Data Parsing
 - Data Analysis
-

Introduction


- Forensics defined
- Forensic Food chain..

Filesystems

Files

Bitstreams

Evidence



Data Recovery

- Convert bitstream to file system
 - The Coroner's Toolkit
 - Recovers deleted files
 - TCT Utils
 - Examine deleted directory entries
 - Total file system awareness
 - Read "deleted" data
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Data Parsing

- Convert file systems into evidence candidates -- files
 - File content requires understanding file formats
 - Email, jpeg, .doc, ELF, etc
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Data Analysis

- Keyword searches
 - Extract “evidence” from data
 - JPEG files containing illegal images
 - Log files containing access information
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Anti-forensics

- *Data is evidence*
- Anti-Forensic Theory
 - Data Destruction
 - Data Hiding
 - Data Contraception

“Attempting to limit the quantity and quality of forensic evidence (since 1999)”

Data Destruction

- Deleted file residue
 - Dirty inodes
 - Directory entries
 - Dirty data blocks
 - File System Activity
 - inode time stamps
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The Defiler's Toolkit

- Necrofile
 - Sanitize deleted inodes
- Klismafile
 - Sanitize directory entries

Before and after

Data Hiding

- Requirements
- Theory
- Implementations
- Demos

“Aspire to subtlety”

Data Hiding – Requirements

- Covert
 - Outside the scope of forensic tools
 - Temporarily – ergo, insecure long term storage
 - Reliable
 - Data must not disappear
 - Secure
 - Can't be accessed without correct tools
 - Encrypted
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Data Hiding Theory

“Ladies and Gentlemen, I'm here
to talk about FISTing”




Filesystem Insertion & Subversion Technique

- FISTing is inserting data into places it doesn't belong
- Data storage in meta-data files
 - e.g. Journals, directory files, OLE2 files, etc.
- Modifying meta-data is dangerous!
 - What holes can you FIST?



Holes for FISTing



FISTing implementations

- Rune FS
 - Stores data in the “bad blocks” file
- Waffen FS
 - Stores data in the ext3 journal file
- KY FS
 - Stores data in directory files



Rune FS

- Bad Blocks inode 1, root ("/") inode 2
 - Exploits (historically) incorrect ext2 implementation within TCT
 - Up to 4GB storage
 - TCT pseudo code (old):

```
if (inode < ROOT_INODE || inode > LAST_INO)  
    return BAD_INODE;
```
 - Just a regular inode file
-

Waffen FS

- Adds an ext3 journal to an ext2 FS
- Exploits e2fsck (and lame forensic tools)
 - e2fsck supports both ext2 & ext3
 - Has to guess which FS it's looking at
- Usually 32Mb storage (average journal sz)
- e2fsck pseudo code:

```
for (j_ent = journal; ; j_ent += j_ent->size)
    if (IS_VALID(j_ent) == FALSE) /* end of the journal */
        return JOURNAL_OK;
```
- Regular file with a fake journal meta-data

KY FS

- Utilizes null directory entries
- Exploits the kernel, e2fsck & forensic tools
- Storage space limited by disk size

Kill Your File System

KY FS details

- Kernel + fsck pseudo code:

```
for (dp = dir; dp < dir_end; dp += dp->rec_len)
    if (dp->inode == 0) /* is deleted? */
        continue;
```

- Forensic tools pseudo code:

```
if (dp->inode == 0 && dp->namelen > 0)
    /* recover deleted file name */
```

Data Contraception

- Better not to create data than to destroy it
- Prevent data from ever being stored on disk
- Use common Unix utilities to reduce the quality of evidence

“What is the act of not creating?”

Data Contraception: Implem.

■ Rexec

- Remote execution of binaries without creating a file on disk
 - Uses non-exotic utilities to create a remote process image
 - Solves the bootstrapping issue for accessing hidden data stores
 - Reduces effectiveness of honeypots – no binaries to “capture”
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Summary

- Summarised Unix File System
 - Presented overview of forensics
 - Presented a methodology for anti-forensics
 - Demonstrated simple mechanisms to defeat digital forensic analysis
 - Owned your file system
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Q & A
